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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if the
Federal Government could realize cost savings through an
analysis of contracts that have been terminated. A sampling
of contracts from various Federal Government agencies was
gathered and divided into two categories : terminations for
financial reasons and terminations for non-financial reasons
Terminations for financial reasons were analyzec .vith a
bankruptcy prediction model, while a qualitative analysis
was performed on terminations for non-financial reasons.
From the bankruptcy prediction model analysis, it was
apparent that the model was only somewhat useful as a pre-
dictor of termination for default. It was shown from the
qualitative analysis that the Federal Government was pre-
dominantly at fault in terminations for convenience (95%
of the analysis sample) and that 66% of the terminations for
convenience in the sample were for reasons that the Federal
Government could have controlled.
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I. TNTRODUCriON
A. THESIS PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is d investigate if the
Federal Government could realize .est savings through an
analysis of contracts that have been terminated. In order
to conduct the analysis, a sampling of contracts from vari-
ous Federal Government agencies f-om different services
across the country has been gath d and div_ded i d two
categories : terminations for financial reasons and termina-
tions for non-financial reasons. Terminations for financial
reasons were analyzed with a bankruptcy prediction model,
while a qualitative analysis was performed on terminations
for non-financial reasons.
This country's biggest contracting entity for material
from the private sector is the Federal Government, pa^ icu-
larly the Department of Defense. DoD's procurement budget
has averaged $74.9 billion dollars ove the past five years
(DoD Deputy Comptroller, 1985). It is estimated that there
have been one million DoD contracts awarded during fiscal
year 1985 with 100,000 different contractors at a dollar
value of $96 billion. These contracts are managed to suc-
cessful completion or termination by hundreds of Federal
Government agencies independently across the country.
Not all Federal Government contracts are successfully
completed, nor are they expected to be. There are extensive
8
Federal Government acquisition regulations designed specifically
for the disposition of terminations. According to FLITE
(Federal Legal Information Through Electronics), there have
been approximately 45,000 terminations during the past thirty
years. These terminations have resulted in additional costs
to the Federal Government. Examples of these costs are re-
bidding the contract, resultant delays in delivery of the
goods or services, and the personnel and administration
involved in processing the terminations (including appeals).
These costs cannot be eliminated, but perhaps if sufficient
attention is directed at the problem of terminations, the
costs could be minimized.
B. QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED
The analyses performed for this thesis have been designed
to provide answers to two questions concerning contract
terminations
:
(1) is it possible to predict terminations due to con-
tractor's financial problems by using contractor
financial information, and
(2) can any significant trends be identified in the
reasons for terminations due to non-financial
reasons?
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In an attempt to answer these questions, a multiple
stage research method was used. The method had three major
steps
:
(1) various Defense Contract Administrative Services
Management Areas (DCASMA) throughout the United States
were contacted to obtain data concerning terminated
contracts
;
(2) financial data were obtained from pre-award surveys
for defaulted contractors that had experienced
financial difficulties (predominantly terminations
for default)
;
(3) this financial data was then analyzed using a
bankruptcy prediction model to determine whether or
not the termination for default could be predicted
prior to contract award by the procurement officer.
If such prediction is possible, it could save the Federal
Government time and money by eliminating those contractors
exhibiting a questionable financial situation, and thus help
reduce the many cases of Government contracts that are liti-
gated. According to the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals ( ASBCA, 19 85), there are approximately 3,500 of
these cases each year at a total dollar cost of $3.5 million
The bankruptcy prediction model to be used was developed by
Professor Edward I. Altman, one of the world's leading ex-
perts on corporate bankruptcy and analysis (Altman, 1971)
.
Terminations not related to financial problems (pre-
dominantly terminations for convenience) were analyzed in
an entirely different manner. Instead of using a prediction
model, the approach was to review a random sampling of these
terminations and place the reasons why they were initiated
into several categories. Next, it was determined what per-
centage of the sample each reason represented. Any detri-
mental reasons were then analyzed for possible actions that




Section II lays out the basic framework of what is in-
volved in Federal Government contracting. It will include a
discussion of how contracts are awarded, how a contractor
is deemed capable of fulfilling a Federal Government con-
tract, what is involved in pre-award surveys (who is subject
to them, positive and negative pre-awards and their conse-
quences), and Small Business Administration's (SBA) role in
contracting (including award of a Certificate of Competency
overruling a negative pre-award). Finally, terminations for
default and convenience are defined and examined in detail.
Section III discusses the collection of data for analysis
in subsequent chapters. This includes interviews with repre-
sentatives of Government contracting agencies across the
country concerning terminations for convenience/default and
local procedures for handling these terminations. This
section also explains the use of Multiple Discriminant
Analysis (MDA) for predicting default terminations.
Section IV analyzes the financial data (from pre-award
surveys) covering known good Government contracts and contrast
that financial data with defaulted Government contracts
using MDA. The analysis consists of computing Altman's
"Z-Scores" for each of the good as well as defaulted contrac-
tors to determine whether or not MDA is a useful predictor
of contractor default.
Section V analyzes the results of classifying the sampled
non-financial terminations into categories of reasons, and
11
a determination is made concerning any pronounced trends
Also, possible causes for these trends are suggested.
Section VI summarizes and evaluates all significant




Before discussing contract terminations in detail, it
is appropriate to present some general information about
(1) Government contracting and (2) the selection of the
source process in order to establish a frame of reference
for subsequent discussions.
1 . Federal Government Contracting
When a Federal Government agency requires supplies
or services from the private sector, the requirement results
in a contract between the Federal Government and a contractor.
The Federal Government contracting process (by no means a
simple one) begins with the identification of a requirement
by an agency, which needs to be done as accurately and com-
pletely as possible. The requirement is submitted as a
purchase request to the contracting officer. A contract is
either formally advertised for bids or negotiated by the
contracting officer, and finally awarded to one contractor.
The active contract is then usually monitored/maintained by
an Administrative Contract Officer (ACO) from a local DCASMA
through any modifications (e.g., specification and/or quantity
changes), to either its successful completion (delivery of
goods or services) or termination (Defense Contract Management
for Technical Personnel, 1983) .
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2 . Selection of the Source
When selecting a contractor to fulfill the require-
ments of a Federal Government contract, it is imperative that
no bias enter into the selection process. The goods or
services being contracted should be advertised in such a way
that all interested contractors have an opportunity to sub-
mit their bids before the closing date.
Prior to contract award, prospective contractors are
evaluated in two broad categories: responsiveness and
responsibili I . The determination of responsiveness in-
volves a review by the contracting officer of the business
aspects of the submitted bid/offer. This portion of the
evaluation is concerned with whether or not the contractor
(1) is in conformity with all contract terms, (2) is in
agreement with the delivery schedule, or (3) has made any
adjustments or qualifications to the original contract
(Defense Contracts Management for Technical Personnel, 1983)..
The evaluation of responsibility involves a review
of the contractor's operations and qualifications. Infor-
mation is gathered from both the contractor and DoD sources
in order to make a determination as to whether or not the
contractor will be able to deliver (in accordance with the
responsive claims). Some of the major areas of interest are:
(1) sufficient financial stability,
(2) contractor's performance record,
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R&D) -th sma 1 business concerr ( Defense Contra Manage-
ment ror Technical Personnel, 19 3). Each departs t and
agency within DoD maintains an office for management of DoD
small business and disadvantaged business utilization.
These offices ensure that small business concerns receive
fair and equitable consideration whenever a contract is
offered for bid (Defense Contracts Management for Technical
Personnel, 1983). SBA has the statutory authority to certify
the competency of any small business as to elements of
responsibility, including (but not limited to) capability,
capacity, credit, and integrity (Defense Contracts Management
for Technical Personnel, 1983 ). Therefore, when a small
business is given a negative pre-award survey from a local
DCASMA, that company may appeal to SBA for reconsideration.
If SBA decides that the concern is capable of fulfilling the
contract, then a certificate of competency (COC) is issued.
Contracting officers must accept SBA ~0C * s , or must appeal
to SBA headquarters.
B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACT TERMINATIONS
As part of the provisions in a contract, the Federal
Government has the right to terminate the contract either due
to (1) default by the contractor or (2) for the convenience
of the Government, depending upon the circumstances.
1. Terminations for Default
A Federal Government contract is terminated for
default when it has been determined that the contractor is
16
in breach of contract and no longer capable of fulfilling
the requirements of the contract ( Defense Contracts Manage-
ment for Technical Personnel, 1983). Terminations for default
are usually enacted when the contractor (1) is unable to
meet the required delivery date, (2) is incapable of manu-
facturing the product according to specifications or (3) for
any other reason is unable to provide the contracted pro-
duct (s) in accordance with the contract (Defense Contracts
Management for Technical Personnel, 1983). Default termina-
tions are usually enacted as a last resort, after the con-
tractor has been given an opportunity to improve or correct
any delinquent portion of the contract. Among the large
number of current active contracts across the country, there
are instances of contractors who become delinquent in the
terms of their contracts with the Federal Government. But
the delinquency (e.g., being behind schedule one week) may
be corrected within a reasonable period of time, so it would
be a mistake to terminate the contract for default. If not
corrected by the contractor in a timely manner, the Procure-
ment Contracting Officer (PCO) should take some kind of
action (e.g., issue a ten-day "cure" notice to the contrac-
tor) so that the contractor cannot claim breach of contract
if the contract is eventually terminated for default.
There are instances involving possible terminations
for default when certain deficiencies (including acts of God,
acts of the Federal Government, and strikes) are excusable.
17
However if the deficiency is not considered excusable and
the PCO believes the contract could be terminated success-
fully, the PCO is obligated to act accordingly (Defense
Contracts Management for Technical Personnel, 1983).
Several problems develop when a termination for de-
fault is enacted. First, if any advance or progress payments
have been paid to the contractor for work not yet performed,
they must be recouped ( dually through litigation). Second,
the contracting office ust send representatives o the
contractor's work location and account for all work (thus
far) accomplished. Third, a new contract must be negotiated
with a new supplier and any difference in price must also
be recouped from the defaulted contractor. Fourth, many
contractors take the Federal Government to court (claiming
breach of contract by the Federal Government) thus tying up
the process even further. Fifth, while all this is happen-
ing the contract remains unfilled (possibly resulting in a
weapons system being out of action)
.
2 . Terminations for Convenience
The second instance for the termination of a Federal
Government contract before completion is for the convenience
of the Federal Government. This is the right the Federal
Government has to direct the contractor to stop performance
on a contract, and reach a settlement on what has been com-
pleter up to that point. Consequently, while this type of
termination ay be in the best interest of the Federal
18
Government, the contractor is very likely to benefit as
well. These terminations are usually enacted when:
(1) the Federal Government is no longer in need of
the product being manufactured (e.g., when a
weapons system is retired)
,
(2) there has been a change in the specifications
(engineering changes) for the contracted item,
(3) there is a change in political policy (e.g., ultimate
disapproval of SSTs)
,
(4) there is poor contract administration,
(5) there has been a "bad buy" (improperly justified,
impossibility of performance, or insufficiently
researched requirements), or
(6) a termination for default is overturned by the
ASBCA and a termination for convenience is awarded.
The Federal Government agency requiring the con-
tracted material or services initiates the termination for
convenience process when the agency determines the contract
is no longer necessary. The agency submits a termination
request to the contracting officer who has the authority, as
well as the responsibility, to act upon the request as
expeditiously as possible. The timing of the termination
process becomes critical because each additional day of work
by the contractor means a continued cost to the Federal
Government. In accordance with DAR guidelines, the contract-
ing officer must first issue a notice of termination to the
contractor and then proceed to negotiate the terms for
settlement of the partially completed contract.
Depending upon the reason for termination and the
type of material being procured, the settlement could be
19
based either upon an inventory of what had been produced
up to the official date of termination of upon an audit of
all the /ork performed by the contractor on the contract.
(The contracting officer might also determine that it would
be cost beneficial to the Federal Government for the con-
tracted work to be completed, even though the reason for
termination was that the material was no longer required.)
In addition to these costs, the Federal Government will
ordinarily have to pay the contractor a profit on w at has
b m completed (but not if the contractor was operating a
a ioss) . Combining these costs to the Federal Government
with other related costs such as administration and per-
sonnel, terminations for convenience can be expensive.
C. SUMMARY
Since contract terminations are costly in manpower,
administration and time, a forecasting model would be
valuable for the evaluation of prospective contractors. This
model could identify those contractors with a strong poten-
tial for default or inability to deliver contracted items in
a timely manner. Part of the objective of this thesis was
to test the usefulness of an existing bankruptcy prediction
model in predicting default termination (Section IV) . In
addition to this forecasting model, a frequency analysis
was performed on terminations due to non-financi L reasons
(which were primarily terminations for convenien 2) to identify




This section discusses the data that was collected for
analysis and the methods used to gather it. The types of
information that were required included:
(1) contractors that had been terminated for default
or convenience, and
(2) corresponding financial data on these contractors.
The first type was acquired from FLITE and bankruptcy
notification letters, and the second from pre-award surveys
and DCASR files.
1. FLITE
The first source of data on terminations for default
and convenience was a search report produced by FLITE
located at Lowery AFB in Denver, Colorado. FLITE is able to
do data searches (by subject) of federal legal information
they have on file, which includes any records of terminations
that had been litigated. A request for a search of termina-
tions for default and convenience resulted in a report con-
taining information on 4 5,000 cases of Board of Contract
Appeals decisions, dating back to 1956. The report also
provided cumulative totals of the number of occurrences of
these terminations which give an indication of their fre-
quency over the years. The data from the report proved
helpful in identifying thirty-six cases of terminations for
21
convenience and related detailed information on the reasons
for terminations, which was used in the subsequent analysis.
With respect to terminations for default, however, the report
was not very useful. Although it identified numerous ter-
minations for default, it did not provide the contractors'
specific financial data needed for analysis.
2 . Pre-Award Surveys
The second source of data came from the pre-award
surveys performed by DCASMAs . A pre-award survey is one of
the services a DCASMA provides to contracting officers as a
step in the process of awarding a contract. The survey is
a formal review conducted of potential contractors to
determine how responsible they are (according to the responsi-
bility requirements detailed above in paragraph A (2) of
Section II) . A survey is documented using Standard Form (SF)
140 3, which should include all the information a Pre-Award
Survey Monitor (PASM) would need about a company to make a
determination of either award or no award. Part of the
information from the form (Exhibit 1) is an abstract of the
company's latest financial figures, and it is this data that
were used in the MDA discussed below.
The DCASMAs that were contacted had pre-award
surveys for contractors on file for the past three years.
With the assistance of the Pre-Award Survey Monitors (PASM)
,
the company files were reviewed to identify known defaulted
firms to determine if the financial part of a pre-award
22
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survey (which would be necessary for the data analysis) had
been conducted. (A financial inquiry is not required in
every pre-award survey.) The largest part of this data was
gathered upon a visit to the DCASMA in Inglewood, California,
while the rest resulted from phone calls to nine DCASMAs
across the country. These pre-award surveys were the sole
source of financial information for terminations for default.
Although ninety-six different cases were collected, the total
number actually used was limited by:
(1) whether or not the financial part of a pre-award
survey had been conducted,
(2) whether or not the DCASMA had any record of the
company , and
(3) the cooperation of the DCASMAs in releasing the
information (some were extremely reluctant despite




3 . Bankruptcy Notification Letters
The third source of data for terminations was the
Legal Office (Bankruptcy Division) of the U.S. Army Finance
and Accounting Center, Fort Ben Harrison in Indianapolis,
Indiana. The Legal Office administers all bankruptcy cases
for the Army. Part of their processing of cases is to dis-
tribute to various Army commands letters of notification that
identify Army contractors which have filed for bankruptcy
under either Chapter 10 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Act. Upon
request, the Legal Office forwarded copies of sixty of these
notifications for the analysis of this thesis (Exhibit 2).
The next step was to obtain financial information on
the contractors that were identified by these letters. As
24
DEPARTMENT OP THE ARMY
U. S. ARMT riNANCI ANO ACCOUNTING CtNTt»
INDIANAPOLIS. INDIANA <•!«•
In Reply Refer To:
BROWNS TRANSPORT SUPPLY, 24 August 1984
3151 Casita Way,
Sacramento, CA (FINCL/143-84)
SUBJECT: Chapter 7 Case
HEADS OF OA SPECIAL STAFF AGENCIES
COMMANOERS OF MAJOR ARMY FIELD COMMANDS
ALL FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS
PASS TO: LEGAL, PROCUREMENT, AND TRANSPORTATION OFFICIALS
1. Information has been received by this command that captioned debtor filed
a voluntary liquidation petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on
11 June 1984 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
California, Sacramento, CA, Case No. 284-0207907. Under the new Bankruptcy
Rules, effective 1 August 1983, and applicable to proceedings then pending,
the time for filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 7 liquidation case has been
reduced to 90 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors (see
Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)).
2. No setoff of any debt owing to the debtor will be effected in view of the
automatic stay under Section 362(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code. Instead,
amounts due which were earned prior to the date the petition was filed, and
wnich are available to be applied in setoff under Section 553 of the
Bankruptcy Code, will be properly vouchered, certified for payment and
forwarded to this command, ATTN: FINCL.
3. Payment for supplies or services furnished on and after the date the
petition was filed under the Bankruptcy Code, will be made as directed by this
command (FINCL) after considering the provisions of paragraph 9-25, AR
37-107. Other considerations notwithstanding, amounts earned prior to or
subsequent to the date the petition was filed will not be withheld from
assignees pursuant to the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, except to the
extent provided in said Act, as amended, 31 U.S.C. Section 3727, 41 U.S.C.
Section 15.
4. Any known or potential claims by and against the U. S. Army, which
includes all open contracts with the debtor, will be reported to this command
by electrical message within 15 days of the date of this letter. This command
is responsible for the administration and coordination of all
bankruptcy/ insolvency matters within and for the Department of the Army. No
other component will execute a proof of claim in these matters.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
Copies Furnished:
/ <* 0/ Attorney- AdvisorC ;





di -ussed in part 2 above, this information would be avail-
able from the pre-award surveys (SF 1403) if a financial
review had been conducted on any of the contractors . In
order to determine if there were pre-award surveys, the
sixty contractors from across the country were matched by
zip code to the regional DCASMA that would have been the
monitor if a pre-award survey had been performed. It was
necessary to interview each of the DCASMAs by telephone to
find out (1) if there was a file on a particular contractor,
(2) if the file had a pre-award survey with financial
information, and (3) if the PASM would be willing to release
this information for analysis in this thesis. Of the sixty
letters obtained on contractors, only twelve met all three




RESULTS OF BANKRUPTCY NOTIFICATION LETTER SCREENING
No. of contractors not on file at a DCASMA 21
No. of contractors on file, but without a pre-award
survey 27
No. of contractors meeting all three criteria 12
Total no. of Bankruptcy Notification Letters
Received 60
4. DCASR Files
The fourth source of data on terminations came upon
a visit to the DCASR office in Los Angeles. The Terminations
26
Section of that office is responsible for monitoring strictly
terminations for convenience (terminations for default are
administered by the originating PCO) . It has on file infor-
mation on all the active terminations being partially or
completely processed for convenience, some of which were
still unresolved after a year or more of negotiation.
The DCASRs allowed access to their files, which pro-
vided the largest part of the data used in the analysis on
terminations for non-financial reasons. In order to conduct
the analysis, the reasons that the terminations were being
processed for convenience were required. The DCASR did not
have this information readily available. Gathering the
information would have necessitated a search through the
file on every case. Given the number of cases involved and
the time limit of the visit, such a search was not feasible.
Consequently, in order to find out the reasons for termina-
tions, the PCO for each case was interviewed. Although this
proved to be extremely time-consuming and not completely
successful (a few discrepancies were encountered in comparing
information the DCASR LA had on file with certain PCOs)
,
most of the PCOs were cooperative and helpful in providing
the information that was requested. Some of them supplied
data of terminations (both for convenience and default)
that had not been on file at the DCASR LA.
27
B. DEVELOPMENT C RATIO ANALYSIS
1 . Studies Using Univariate Analysis
Merwin (1942) conducted a study during the 1930's
to show the usefulness of financial ratio measurements to
distinguish between failing and non-failing firms. Credit
lenders, credit rating agencies, and investors have attempted
to evaluate firms using these ratios. The ratios were
derived from financial st jments (i.e., balance sheet,
income statement, and statement of changes in financial
position) and then compart to industry averages or some
benchmark which would se' te a viable firm from one
experiencing financial difficulty.
Most studies have cited profitability, solvency, and
liquidity ratios as the most useful in determining whether
a firm is functioning appropriately. However, none of these
studies can agree upon the most effective indicator of even-
tual financial collapse (Altman, 1971, p. 58). In prac-
tically every case, a univariate type of methodology was
employed to signal problems ( Beaver, 1966) . Ratio analysis
of this nature could lead to improper conclusions. For
example, a company which has experienced two to three con-
secutive periods of losses or shows signs of problems related
to insolvency may be regarded as a candidate for being
dissolved. However, this same firm could possess above
average liquidity, which would keep these pi olems fro
causing insolvency. Consequently, it is necessary to look
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at the entire financial situation of a firm to judge if it
is a going concern.
2
.
Studies Using Multivariate Analysis
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) is a statis-
tical technique which attempts to classify an observation
into one of two possible a priori groupings, depending upon
the characteristics of the observation. It is used to
characterize predictions where the dependent variable appears
in qualitative form (e.g., failing or non-failing). After
the groupings have been decided upon, financial data are
collected for the observations. MDA attempts to derive a
linear combination of these characteristics (translated into
ratios) which best discriminates between the two groups
(Altman, 1971, p. 59). Firm selection was based on pairing
bankrupt firms with non-bankrupt firms of the same type of
industry and asset size.
The primary advantage of this type of "character-
istics classification" is its ability to analyze a range of
differing financial indicators, rather than individually
examining these ratios on a univariate basis. In addition,
examining these ratios in combination helps to remove any
potential ambiguity or misclassification that a single ratio
study might imply.
3 Altman 's Model
From an original list of twenty-two variables
(ratios), Altman selected a combination of five ratios as
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the most capable of predicting bankruptcy. He arrived at
hese variables in the following manner:
(1) observing the statistical significance of using
alternative ratios (which included determining the
relative contributions of each of these independent
ratios)
;
(2) evaluating intercorrelations between the relevant
variables
;
(3) observing the predictive accuracy of the various
profiles; and
(4) using his own judgment. (Altman, 1971, p. &2)
Altman's final function is as follows:
= .012X(1) + .014X(2) + .033X(3) + .006X(4) + .999X(5)
where
X(l) = Working Capital/Total Assets
X(2) = Retained Earnings/Total Assets
X(3) = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/
Total Assets
X(4) = Market Value of Equity/Book Value
of Total Debt
X(5) = Sales/Total Assets
Z = Overall Index
1. X(l) (Working Capital/Total Assets) —This ratio
measures the net liquid assets of the firm relative
to its total capital. Working capital is defined as
current assets minus current liabilities. If a
firm experiences constant losses, its current assets
decrease at a faster rate than its fixed assets.
2. X(2) (Retained Earnings/Total Assets) —This ratio
is a m r -:sure of total profitability over time. The
age oi i firm is implicit in this ratio, since a
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young firm will show a low X(2) as compared to a
more mature firm which has had time to build up
its profits. Consequently, a young firm is somewhat
discriminated against. However, several studies
(Altman, 1971; Dun and Brads treet's Annual Failure
Records, 1983 ) have indicated that failure is more
prevalent among younger firms. For example, 53%
of the firms that failed in 1980 did so within the
first five years of existence. In addition, this
rate has been between 53-60% since 1952. Prior to
1952, the percentage was even higher (Altman,
1983) . Other trends will also produce a weak X(2)
variable. A firm with a history of paying dividends
regularly will have a lower X(2) than a comparable
firm which "plows back" its earnings to the company.
In addition, unprofitable operations will result
in a poor X ( 2)
.
X(3) (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total
Assets) --This ratio is a measure of the productivity
of the firm's assets (taking away any tax or leverage
factors). When a firm's total liabilities expand at
a faster rate than its total assets, the resultant
interest expense puts a considerable drain on the
firm's earnings (thus lowering its profitability).
The value of a firm's assets is determined by their
relative earning power.
X(4) (Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total
Debt) --This ratio shows how far assets can decline in
value (measured by the market value of the equity
(all outstanding stock) plus total debt) before
liabilities exceed assets and the firm becomes
insolvent. To illustrate, assume a company has a
market value for its equity of $5,000 and total
debt of $2,500. This company's assets could drop
in value by two-thirds ($5,000) before it became
insolvent. On the other hand, that same firm with
equity valued at only $1,250 would become insolvent
as soon as the assets drop one-third ($1,250) in
value. The reciprocal of X(4) is the Debt/Equity
Ratio.
X(5) (Sales/Total Assets)—This ratio illustrates
the sales generating ability of the firm's assets
(e.g., management's ability in dealing with compe-
tition). According to Altman's study, this ratio
was the least significant on an individual basis, but
ranked second in its overall contribution to the
discriminating model.
31
When using the MDA model, it is extremely important
to scale the variables in the proper manner. For example,
an X(l) of ten percent should be expressed as 10.0% (not
.10). The same scaling is used for X(l) through X(4).
However, X(5) should be expressed differently. An X(5) of
200% should be expressed as 2.0.
4 . Explanation of Altman's Gray Area
Once a firm's Z-Score has been computed, it is neces-
sary to classify it as either bankrupt or non-bankrupt.
Using Altman's definitior all firms with a Z-Score greater
than 2.99 fall into the non-bankrupt category, while those
with a Z-Score less than 1.81 fall inco the bankruptcy
category. Consequently, the area between 1.81-2.99 has been
labeled the "gray area" (zone of ignorance). The gray area
represents a range in the observation scale into which firms
could fall with a significant probability that they have
L en misclassif i~i. In other words, those firms whose Z-
Scores fall wit; . the gray area may or may not become
bankrupt. To compensate for all those firms which fall
within this gray area, a guideline has been established.
In Altman's stud' (1968), the least number of misclassifi-
cations (bankrupt versus non-bankrupt) appeared within the
range 2.67-2.68. Therefore, the midpoint of that interval
(2.675) was chosen as the discriminator value. Firms with
a Z-Score less than 2.675 are placed in the bankrupt cate-
gory, while firms with a Z-Score greater than 2.675 are
placed in the non-bankrupt category.
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5 . Proposed Use of the Model
Altman's five ratios are used in this thesis to
attempt to predict termination for default. Altman's model
is used because of its proven application in analyzing the
financial weaknesses of a firm, and because the financial
data that were collected met the requirements of his
variables (with some minor modifications, which are discussed
below)
.
The financial data for computing ratios for the
firms were derived from DD Form 1524-3s and SF 1407s. Al-
though the DD 1524-3 has been replaced by the SF 1407, both
forms provided the necessary data to compute the required
ratios, with three exceptions: (1) retained earnings is
grouped with equity under one heading (net worth)
, (2) equity
(net worth) is listed at book value (rather than market value)
,
and (3) earnings before taxes is listed (rather than earnings
before interest and taxes) . These exceptions could prove
to be detrimental to the predictive power of the model.
However, under the circumstances it is the best available
information that could be obtained, since several of the
contractors examined were small and therefore did not trade
on exchanges
.
Our analysis also uses Altman's gray area. Any firm
which falls within that area is given particular recognition
and categorized using an extrapolated midpoint as discussed
in paragraph B(2) of Section IV.
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C. SUMMARY
The preceding discussion identifies the several advantages
multivariate analysis has over univariate analysis. The
next section describes the actual analysis performed and
discusses the suitability of using MDA to aid in the predic-
tion of default termination. The modifications to the ratios
that were necessary are explained, and their impact on the
results evaluated.
34
IV. ANALYSIS OF TERMINATIONS DUE TO FINANCIAL REASONS
A. Z-SCORE EQUATION
Ideally, the analysis for this thesis would be performed
in exactly the same manner that Altman did when he tested
the validity of his equation. However, the data collected
had certain uncontrollable limitations (as discussed below)
.
These limitations dictated modifications to Altman' s equation
so that a Z-Score could be computed for each firm.
1 . Input Data
One limitation of the data was the size of the sample
The data gathering discussed in Section III resulted in only
fifty-two firms for subsequent use in the analysis (as com-
pared to Altman' s sample size of sixty-six) . However, the
data was collected from all across the country (e.g., Boston,
Philadelphia, Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and Seattle) and included a wide assortment of firm types
and sizes. Paralleling Altman 's analysis of two groups
of paired firms (one group of bankrupt firms paired by
asset size to a group of non-bankrupt firms) , each termina-
tion for default firm, Table 2, was paired with a non-
termination for default firm, Table 3, of approximately the
same asset size. The firms in both tables are listed in
descending order of asset size. The mean asset size of the
firms in this analysis was $1,720,000, with a range of
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TABLE 2
DATA ON CONTRACTORS THAT WERE TERMINATED FOR DEFAULT
(Rounded to Nearest Dollar)
WORKING NET TOTAL NET
CAPITAL* WORTH* LIABILITIES* SALES** EBT** EBIT**
$ 552354 $1314927 $11378457 $4841814 $-770538 $ 367307
-3500000 -2167000 10052000 4200000 -1627999 -622799
571740 826770 2346886 4340602 174404 409092
481157 537026 2590935 6429456 -485975 -226881
414798 525177 2387167 9451815 980528 1219244
886512 951217 1505683 5830611 57266 207834
1050530 -203288 2190155 1752168 200726 419742
697909 697413 740970 2350275 20220 94317
204307 404887 698589 1313292 54584 124443
-205513 356991 703361 168984 233360 303696
-847780 -970579 1989897 355493 -1103952 -904962
490934 169894 652165 1152084 100848 166064
-254336 159701 611464 1346844 103696 164842
91746 365747 204353 1153419 161688 182123
-42356 179856 310492 72204 -8148 22901
-313695 -234757 717516 545666 17662 89414
-377063 -1326079 1790285 121055 -959217 -780189
128554 229260 191952 1029024 182487 201682
-168168 -172255 496503 738468 202548 252198
-471536 -344570 567762 296585 -248754 -191979
25035 20434 141622 256292 28412 42574
-130983 -21073 180751 1932987 -50835 -32760
24024 82024 45556 125758 -5698 -1142
8752 46935 68588 238009 19982 26841
1085 24314 77996 115214 -8034 -234




Adjusted Data (as explained in paragraph A(2))
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TABLE 3
DATA ON CONTRACTORS THAT WERE NOT TERMINATED FOR DEFAULT









































































































































































Adjusted Data (as explained in paragraph A(2))
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$20,000 to $13,000,000. Since many of the DCASMAs contacted
were reluctant to release the names of the sample firms, it
was impossible to match them up by industry, as Altman did.
Of the pairings, 85% were within (plus or minus) 10% of each
other in asset size (the remaining 15% of the pairings
breakdown as follows: 12% are within 20% of each other and
3% are within 50%)
.
2 . Modif i cat ion of the Discriminant ^unction and
Input 3ata
As discussed in Section III, the financial data used
in the analysis was taken from pre-award surveys (SF 1407)
.
Therefore, the analysis was limited by the extent of the
information contained in these forms. The information avail-
able required modification of not only the discriminant
function equation but the input data as well. The equation
had to be changed because the X(2) variable (Retained
Earnings/Total Assets) calls r retained earnings which is
not included in the SF 1407. consequently, the (2) variable
had to be omitted from the equation.
In order to compute the remaining four variables in
Altman' s formula, some of the financial data elements from
the SF 1407s haa to be manipulated before they could be used.
First, variable X(3) uses earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT) , the SF 1407 gives only earnings before taxes. To
approximate EBIT, it was decided to multip r total liabilities
by 10%, the interest rate used by OMB, and chen add this to
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earnings before taxes. Second, several of the data points
contained sales and profit figures for periods of less than
one year. In order to approximate what that data would be
after one full year, an extrapolation was performed on all
income data. Each income figure was divided by the number
of months it represented and then multiplied by 12. Finally,
variable X(4) calls for market value of equity, while the
SF 140 7 gives only book value. There was no recourse in
this instance (since firm identity was generally unavailable)
and no modification was attempted.
3 . Use of Minitab
The statistical analysis was performed using Minitab.
The financial data was set into columns, modifications (as
explained above) were made as necessary, and the discriminant
function equation was used to calculate Z-Scores.
B. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
1 . Initial Classification
The results from the Minitab computations were segre-
gated into two groups: (1) contractors that had been terminated
for default (defaulted group) and (2) those that had not been
terminated for default (non-defaulted group) . Two sets of
Z-Scores were computed for each group (a total of four sets)
.
The difference between the two sets within each group was
the calculation of variable X(3) (i.e., in sets one and two,
Table 4, the computations used EBIT, and in sets three and
four, Table 5, the computations used earnings before taxes
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TABLE 4
EBIT Z-SCORES (PAIRED BY ASS^T SIZE OF CONTRACTORS)
Set 1 Set 2
DEFAULTED NON-DEFAULTED
ASSET ASSET
SIZE Z-SCORE SIZE Z-SCORE
$12693384 0.60 $12999876 7.06
7885000 -0.39 7893401 12.02
3173636 2.22 3485990 2.23
3127961 2.12 3101859 1.87
2912944 4.93 3045909 7.27
2456900 3.46 2699225 3.84
1986867 2.16 1929233 1.07
1438383 3.00 1482367 6.09
1103476 2.13 1106570 4.94
1060352 1.18 1048626 6.67
1010318 -3.91 988795 1.50
822059 2.93 836943 7.07
771165 2.21 721695 4.72
570100 4.34 710804 3.42
490348 0.55 472996 6.39
482759 0.76 514128 2.64
464206 -6.70 409987 4.04
421212 5.10 378669 35.15
324248 4.01 313726 4.75
223182 -4.41 229576 1.25
16' 56 2.72 193916 3.95
159678 10.36 175682 5.76
127580 2.26 197605 10.17
115523 3.33 119103 2.47
102310 1.32 110933 2.62
20520 8.84 21792 9.86
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TABLE 5
EBT Z-SCORES (PAIRED BY ASSET SIZE OF CONTRACTORS)
Set 3 Set 4
DEFAULTED NON-DEFAULTED
ASSET ASSET
SIZE Z-SCORE SIZE Z-SCORE
$12693384 0.30 $12999876 7.01
7885000 -0.81 7893401 11.93
3173636 1.98 3485990 1.99
3127961 1.85 3101859 1.59
2912944 4.66 3045909 7.04
2456900 3.26 2699225 3.69
1986867 1.79 1929233 0.85
1438383 2.83 1482367 5.91
1103476 1.92 1106570 4.73
1060352 0.96 1048626 6.50
1010318 -4.56 988795 1.34
822059 2.66 836943 6.96
771165 1.95 721695 4.55
570100 4.22 710804 3.24
490348 0.34 472996 6.22
482759 0.27 514128 2.35
464206 -7.98 409987 3.75
421212 4.95 378669 35.14
324248 3.51 313726 4.60
223182 -5.25 229576 1.11
162056 2.43 193916 3.67
159678 9.99 175682 5.63
127580 2.14 197605 9.97
115523 3.13 119103 2.32
102310 1.07 110933 2.19








(EBT) ) . An analyr's of the four sets of -Scores is pre-
sented in Table 6.
TABLE 6
RESULTS OF Z -SCORE EQUATION ANALYSIS
Set Number/Percent Number/Percent Number/Percent









The Number/Percent Correct column contains the number
of firms in each set that were predicted correctly using
Altman's equation (those with Z-Scores greater than 2.99)
and the corresponding percentage of that set. The Number/
Percent Incorrect column contains the number of firms in each
set that were predicted incorrectly (those with Z-Scores
less than 1.81) and the corresponding percentage of that set.
The Number/Percent Gray Area column contains the number of
firms in each set that fell within the range of 1.81-2.99
(identified as the gray area in paragraph B(4) of Section
III) . The table shows that when using EBT (which is a small
amount than EBIT), the following changes resulted: (1) the
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Number/Percent Correct amount of the Defaulted Group (sets
one and three) increased to ten firms (nine from set one's
Number/Percent Correct column plus one that became a correct
prediction from set one's Number/Percent Incorrect column);
and (2) the Number/Percent Incorrect amount of the Non-
Defaulted Group (sets two and four) increased to four firms
(three from set two's Number/Percent incorrect column plus
one that became an incorrect prediction from set two's
Number/Percent Gray Area column) . Since there were firms
that fell within the gray area (thirteen using EBIT and twelve
using EBT) , it was necessary to conduct a further analysis
to determine in which category (either correct or incorrect)
they should most reasonably be included.
2 . Zone of Ignorance (Gray Area) Midpoint
Since set one (above) contained as many or more data
points (eight firms) in the gray area as the other three
sets, it was used to identify a midpoint which would be the
discriminator for all four sets (when set three, which also
contains eight data points, was used to compute the dis-
criminator the results were insignificantly different from
those obtained using set one's discriminator). Table 7 pre-
sents the data for the development of the discriminator:
(1) each sample firm in set one was compared to the end
points of the gray area; (2) the differences from the end-
points were summed and then divided by the number in the





































Sum of (Z - 1.81)/No. of Firms = 4.267/8 = .533
Sum of (2.99 - Z ) /No . of Firms = 5.173/8 = .647
1.81 + .533 = 2.343
and
2.99 - .647 = 2.343
The result of this analysis revealed a midpoint of 2.343,
which will be the discriminator in this thesis. Using this
value, all the data points in the gray area were reclassified




























With the use of the discriminator
The Number/Percent Correct column contains the number
of firms in each set that were predicted correctly (and the
corresponding percentage of that set) using Altman's equation
and the discriminator. The Number/Percent Incorrect column
contains the number of firms in each set that were predicted
incorrectly (and the corresponding percentage of that set)
.
Although the results have improved somewhat over Table 6
,
the correct predictions are still well below that which
Altman achieved. (Possible explanations for this are dis-
cussed in paragraph C below.)
3. EBT vs EBIT
The change in the profit figures (EBT and EBIT) did
have an effect on the Z-Scores. When EBIT was used in the
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X(3) variable the resultant Z-Scores were adjusted upward
(since EBIT is a larger value due to the presence of the
interest approximation) , as shown by the 8% difference
between set two's and set four's Number/Percent Correct (see
Table 8) . However, there was no change in sets one and
three after adjusting the X(3) variable which shows that
using the lower income figure (EBT) instead of EBIT made no
difference for this particular set of data points. The 8%
difference between sets two and four does indicate that
the predictive power of the model appears to be stronger
when EBIT is used in place of EBT for non-default prediction
C. CONCLUIONS/OBSERVATIONS
From the above analysis, it is apparent that Altraan's
model is only somewhat useful as a predictor of termination
for default. For example, if this analysis had been used
to determine contract award, it would have resulted in five
firms (19%) being incorrectly disqualified (if EBIT had
been used; if EBT had been used it would have resulted in
seven firms, or 27%) . On the other hand, using the Altman
model to predict non-default (i.e., those contractors who
eventually deliver contracted items on time) resulted in
an 81% accuracy. Consequently, it would appear the model
is stronger at predicting non-default rather than default.
The model should not be the lone indicator of awarding
Government contracts for financial purposes; it should be
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used only as an aid. If a PCO or PASM used the model on a
particular firm and obtained a non-default Z-Score, the
probability that this was a correct prediction is greater
than if a default Z-Score had been obtained. If a default
Z-Score had been obtained, further financial analysis should
be conducted to determine the financial stability of the firm,
Of the twenty-six defaulted firms analyzed, fifteen were
less than one million dollars in asset size. The model cor-
rectly predicted seven of the fifteen defaulted firms (46%) .
There were sixteen non-defaulted firms studied (less than one
million dollars in asset size) , in which the model correctly
predicted fourteen (when EBIT was used) as being non-default
for an 88% accuracy. The model is an even stronger predictor
of non-default than default when smaller firms are used.
A final point to be studied from the results: why didn't
the non-defaulted firms result in termination for default
on their contracts when their Z-Scores indicated they should
have (i.e., they were lower than 1.81)? And vice versa, why
did the defaulted firms default when their Z-Score indicated
they were financially sound (greater than 2.99)? There are
several possible explanations for these occurrences:
(1) shortcomings of the model itself (Altman's 95%
accuracy was only in the first year prior to
bankruptcy, and the accuracy dropped to 72% in
year two and 48% in year three; in comparison,
several of this thesis' s data points were two
to three years prior to contractor default)
;
(2) the absence of the X(2) variable from the
computations limited the accuracy of the results;
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(3) the data used required extrapolation/adjustment
to resemble the kinds of data Altman used (if a
PCO or PASM had the required data for the equation,
it would possibly result in better prediction
of both default and non-default) ; and
(4) the incorrectly identified non-defaulted firms
quite possibly could default in the future.
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V. ANALYSIS OF TERMINATIONS FOR NON-FINANCIAL REASONS
A. TERMINATIONS FOR NON-FINANCIAL REASONS
The second part of the analysis of this thesis involved
contracts that were terminated for non-financial reasons.
While terminations for financial reasons were found to be
primarily terminations for default, those for non-financial
reasons were mostly terminations for the convenience of the
Federal Government. The data that were used for analysis
came from DCASR files as discussed in paragraph A of Section
III, and from telephone interviews with DCASMAs and procure-
ment activities across the country. A total of fifty-five
terminations for convenience (twenty- four from the DCASR
files and thirty-one from the telephone interviews) and the
corresponding reasons for terminations were compiled for
this analysis. (Fifteen additional terminations were
excluded from the analysis due to misinformation, lack of
information on the part of the particular DCASMA, or the
age of the contract.)
B. ANALYSIS/FINDINGS
A qualitative analysis was performed on the reasons for
the terminations to determine (1) if they could reasonably
be sorted into a few major categories, (2) if any of the
categories were significantly larger by percentage than the
others, and (3) if suggestions could be made for corrective
action.
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Each of the fifty-five identified convenience terminations
required a phone interview with the cognizant DCASMA or
procurement activity. The interview consisted of inquiries
about the circumstances that led to a request for convenience
termination. The responses received were based upon informa-
tion that the cognizant activities had on file for each con-
tract. The reasons for the terminations that were provided
were then grouped together into several broad categories
(see Appendix B for or ginal listing of reas ns). The final
grouping resulted in nine categories (by reason) which are
listed in Exhibit 3. Each category is discussed in detail
below (percentage of occurrence is listed inside parentheses;
the categories are presented in descending order according
to frequency of occurrence)
.
1. Changes in Computer-Determined Demand (24%) —This cate-
gory is similar to number 2 (Reduced Requirements)
,
except that in this case the decision to either
partially or completely terminate a contract for
convenience was essentially made by a computerized
inventory control system. The computer is limited
in its ability to provide the most exact and timely
identification of what is required by the timeliness
(or lack thereof) of the input that is used, which
is a periodic review/summarization of all demands
received. Even though this system resulted in fre-
quent convenience terminations, two of the inventory
managers interviewed said they were comfortable with
it and considered the costs involved in the termina-
tions were worth the benefit of using a computer.
This category also included cases where an inventory
agency "inherited" an item from another agency and
based the initial procurement quantity on demand
history received from the other agency, which proved
to be inaccurate.
2. Reduced Requirements/No Longer Required (20%)--A
partial or complete termination for convenience was




REASON NUMBER OF PERCENT OF
OCCURRENCES TOTAL
1. Change in Computer-
Determined Demand 13* 24%
2. Reduced Requirements/
No Longer Required 11* 20%
3. Obsolescence 10** 18%
4. Changes in Specifica-
tions/Technical Data 9* 16%
5. Funds Expired/Limited
Funds 5** 9%
6. Research & Development 3***
7. Contractor Internal
Problems 2* 4%
8. Government Failed to
Fulfill Part of Contract 1* 2%




Government at Fault (for reasons it could have controlled)
**
Government at Fault (for reasons beyond its control)
***
Government Not at Fault
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decided it no longer eeded the material or services
(or some part of it) after a contract had been made
with a contractor. (This reason does not include
obsolete requirements which is a separate category
below.
)
3. Obsolescence (18%) --This category includes contracts
for material that were determined to be obsolete
before they were completed and delivered by the
contractor. This almost always resulted from a
change in the state-of-the-art of whatever equipment/
system had initially generated the demand for the
part(s) being procured. (In one case, the part could
not be procured because the sole supplier had gone
out of business.)
4. Changes in Specifications/Technical Data (16%) --This
category includes all the contracts in the sample that
were terminated for convenience because the requiring
Government agency had to make changes in a contract's
specifications and/or technical data after the con-
tract was awarded (and the changes were beyond the
scope of a contract modification)
.
5. Funds Expired/Limited Funds (9%) —This category
included the contracts that had to be terminated
either because the production of the requirement
was becoming too costly or because funds had expired
and it was decided to terminate the requirement.
6. Unsuccessful Research and Development (5%) — Each of
the terminations falling into this category had
unqiue circumstances, but generally were all initiated
to achieve a settlement with a contractor performing
R&D for the Government that was not successfully
completed.
7. Contractor Internal Problems (4%) --This category
includes two contracts terminated for convenience
that could have been terminated for default. This is
because each contractor was experiencing difficulties
in producing the contracted requirement (one due to
the loss of its key technical personnel and the other
due to the contractor's erroneous interpretation of
the data supplied by the PCO) and therefore were in a
default situation. However, the contracts were sub-
mitted for and processed as convenience terminations
instead. Although the reasons for this were not
learned, one DCASR representative indicated that
possible default termination situations are submitted
for convenience termination processing because of the
administrative and time burdens associated with




8. Government Failure to Fulfill Contract Requirement (2%)-
This termination for convenience fell into a category
by itself because it resulted from the unique circum-
stance of the Government "defaulting" on a contract
requirement (a Navy ship which was to have been painted
could not be at an appointed place at a specified time
due to an unanticipated change in operational
commitments)
.
9. Contract Awarded to Another Contractor (2%)—This
final category of termination for convenience resulted
when the Government, while accepting bids from two
prospective contractors, failed to supply the same
amount of information about the contract to each
contractor. After the initial contract award, the
contract was terminated for convenience and awarded
to a second contractor that had gone to court due to
the lack of information.
C. CONCLUSIONS
Although the sample size was limited to fifty-five
convenience terminations, it is fairly representative since
it included a wide range of contracts from across the country
that varied in dollar amount, type of material being procured,
and branch of the military service (including the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps). Once the fifty-five termina-
tions sorted into the resulting nine categories of reasons,
each category was evaluated as to whether the terminations
were (1) the Government's fault (for reasons it could have
controlled) , (2) the Government's fault (for reasons beyond
its control), or (3) not the Government's fault. These three
groupings are discussed below.
1. Government at Fault (for reasons it could have con-
trolled) — It was decided that categories 1, 2, 4, 7,
8, and 9 (a combined total of thirty-seven terminations,
which is 66% of the sample) included reasons for ter-
minations that were the fault of the Government, and
ones that possibly could have been reduced or even
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eliminated. The largest of the is Category 1
(Changes in Computer-Determined C and) , which was
also the largest of all nine categories. As discussed
above, this situation was considered to be worth
the substantial benefit of computerized inventory
management (in other words, any costs associated
with convenience terminations initiated by the
computer were less than the benefits provided by the
computer in reduced manpower and time requirements)
.
However, perhaps the number of resulting convenience
terminations could be reduced if a more frequent
demand review was performed. Category 2 (Reduced
Requirements) could be corrected with closer attention
in the plannin stage (when the determination is
being made by e requiring activity if the require-
ment is necessary) before it 3 submitted for procure-
ment action. Category 4 (Changes in Specif: rations/
Technical Data) indicates that inadequate "homework"
was done in identifying the material requirement.
In order to keep error and ambiguity at a minimum,
the cure would be increased attention to detail by
the technical representatives of the requiring activity
who provide the technical data. (One DCASR interviewed
remarked that this was the most frequent and least
forgivable reason for the numerous terminations for
convenience that they processed.) Category 7 (Con-
tractor Internal Problems) highlighted a tendency for
contracting officers to pursue a contract termination
as one for convenience instead of default. As already
mentioned, this is possibly because a convenience
termination is less complicated to administer
(especially for the PCO, since convenience terminations
are managed centra"Lly by regional OCASRs default
terminations, on t other hand, have to be managed
by the PCO). Howe r, a convenience termination is
likely to end up costing the Government more money
than if it had been processed for default because of
the settlement that has to be negotiated with the con-
tractor (and also because the contractoi as to reim-
burse the Government in defaulted contracts) . Category
8 (Government Failure to Fulfill Contract Requirement)
was a situation that was the Government's fault, but
one that was probably unavoidable because of change in
operational commitments. Category 9 (Contract Awarded
to Another Contractor) might have been avoided with
greater attention to detail to ensure that all
prospective contractors had the necessary information
in order to properly bid on the contract.
Government at Fault (for reasons beyond its control) -
Categories 3 and 5 (a combined total of fifteen terrina-
tions, which is 27% of the sample) included reasons
54
for termination that were the Government's fault but
beyond its control. Category 3 (Obsolescence) indi-
cates that the speed of technology frequently is
faster than the procurement process, making material
being procured obsolete before it is delivered. This
is a problem that may have to be accepted as unavoidable,
unless the procurement bureaucracy improves keeping
pace with changes in technology. Category 5 (Funds
Expired/Limited Funds) might have been eliminated
with more aggressive fiscal management by requiring
activities
.
3. Government not at Fault—Finally , Category 6 (Unsuccess-
ful Research and Development—three terminations which
is 5% of the sample) was for a reason beyond the
Government's control. R&D involves an unknown quality
and degree of risk that will usually have associated
costs
.





The objective of this thesis is to suggest an analytical
procedure that would be useful in the evaluation of potential
Government contractors, and might help in predicting those
firms that would default a contract. This thesis is also
intended to be a review of convenience terminations and to
obtain data of how much the Government might be at fault in
creating termination situations.
B. DATA GATHERING
It has already been acknowledged that the sample data
gathered for both analyses had limitations (i.e., size of the
samples, depth of financial information available). Conse-
quently, any acceptance of conclusions drawn in this thesis
must be made with these limitations in mind (as well as the
modifications that were required to use Altman's model, as
discussed in Section IV and summarized below)
.
Difficulties encountered in the research performed for
this thesis need to be noted that may or may not have had an
impact on the strength of the analyses. First, several infor-
mation sources (mostly DCASMAs) were reluctant to provide
the requested contractor financial data, rightfully citing
restrictions under the Freedom of Information Act. In
response to this, "anonymous" financial data was requested,
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and this was acceptable to some (but still not all) of the
sources. Second, obtaining the financial information on
default terminations proved to be especially difficult mainly
because they are not centrally managed/monitored (as are
convenience terminations) and no DCASMA or procurement agency
kept a consolidated listing of the default terminations that
they processed.
C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The results of default predictions for contract termina-
tions as reported in Section IV were lower than expected.
However, it is felt that Altman's model is still useful in
predicting the financial stability of a firm. As discussed
in Section IV, the sample data that was gathered required
modifications, and it is not known how much they weakened the
results. If any DCASMA were to attempt to use the model in
the pre-award survey phase of awarding a contract, every
attempt should be made to obtain the exact data necessary to
compute Altman's Z-Score. This would include using retained
earnings from a firm's balance sheet to compute the X(2)
variable, and using earnings before interest and taxes (in-
stead of just earnings before taxes) from a firm's income
statement to properly compute the X(3) variable. In addition,
if the current market value of a firm's equity is available
it would naturally be a more reliable figure than using the
book value (as was done in this thesis in order to compute
the X(4) variable). Also, the current period should be a
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full year (instead of using a fraction of a year and having
to extrapolate for a full year from this amount as was done
in the analysis of Section IV) . Finally, further analysis of
a firm's size and the quality of its published financial data
should be done. Small businesses (less than one million
dollars in asset size) are not usually publicly held and so
often submit unaudited financial statements to support their
financial stability. In this case, and if the contract to
be awarded is material in amount, it should be possible to
require an auditor's opinion of the sufficiency of a small
business 's statements prior to contract award.
With respect to the terminations for convenience analysis,
it was anticipated that the Government would be shown pre-
dominantly at fault, which it was (95% of the sample). This
is reasonable since this type of termination is for the
Government's convenience. However, it was determine in the
analysis that 66% of the terminations were for reasons that
the Government could have controlled. If they had been,
then the costs associated with the convenience terminations
would have been saved.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Consolidation of Terminations for Default
It is suggested that an annual report of all termina-
tions for default should be compiled (either centrally by
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) or locally by PCOs ) which
would document the following data on this type of termination:
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(1) name of the contractor; (2) reason for default termina-
tion (identified as being due to an unsatisfactory rating in
technical capability, production capability, quality assurance
capability, financial capability, and/or accounting system)
;
(3) total dollar amount involved; and (4) how many were
reclassified as terminations for convenience.
2 . Further Study
It is also suggested that a follow-up study be con-
ducted in which the recommended changes in gathering data be
incorporated to determine if this will facilitate the analysis
and prediction of contractors* financial sufficiency. The
additional study should include a look at convenience termina-
tions, with a larger sample size using more than one DCASR's
data base, in order to obtain a better idea of the percentage
of convenience terminations that are the actual fault of





ACO - Administrative Contracting Officer
ASBCA - Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
COC - Certificate of Competency
DAR - Defense Acquisition Regulations
DCASMA - Defense Contract Administrative Service
Management Area
DCASR - Defense Contract Administrative Service Region
DLA - Defense Logistics Agency
EBIT - Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
EBT - Earnings Before Taxes
FLITE - Federal Legal Information Through Electronics
MDA - Multiple Discriminant Analysis
PASM - Pre-Award Survey Monitor
PCO - Procurement Contracting Officer
SBA - Small Business Administration
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APPENDIX B
LISTING OF REASONS FOR CONVENIENCE TERMINATIONS



















° Requirement cancelled by
the requiring activity
Requirement cancelled,
then resubmitted as a less
costly requirement
°The program for which item
was required was cancelled




Obsolescence Contracted item became
obsolete (not due to change
in state-of-the-art)
°State-of-the-art change
"Item cancelled due to
change in doctrine




































cancelled due to excessive
cost involving a contract
modification
°A "demo" model was produced
by two firms, and the one
that did not get the con-
tract was reimbursed for
work performed
°Requirement cancelled because
no improvements were being
made in a research project
°R&D item was declared com-
mercially impractical to
manufacture
"Personnel left firm and
took expertise with them
"Erroneous data supplied by
the contractor
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CATEGORY REASONS GIVEN BY PRO- NUMBER OF
CUREMENT AGENCIES OCCURRENCES
8. Government Failed °Navy ship unable to be at
to Fulfill Part appointed place and at
of Contract specified time due to
change in operational
commitments 1
9. Contract Awarded °Contract awarded to
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